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THE BURNING OF SIHPS 

AS A SANITARY MEASURE 

1WO HUNDRE~I) YEARS AGO 
IN MALTA 

The Mediterranean Sea, under the 
influence of the Greeks, had become a 
highway of maritime activity and 
commerce by the fifth century B.c. Its 
shores were dotted by thriving seaports in 
Phoenicia, Greece, Crete, Egypt, 
Carthage, Southern Italy and Sicily. 
The wooden ships that called at these 
port<; carried corn, oil, wine, timber, 
fabrics and wool. 
In this navigational network the Maltese 
Islands became a nodal location especially 
astride the routes to and from the Levant 
for refuge (Tom storms and from pirates, 
for ship repairs and (or the provision of 
f(xxl and drinking water supplies. With 
the passage of centuries these ships, 
initially manned by rowers and later on 
driven by sail, became quite sizeable and 
crowded with large crews. For most 
seafarers, traders and Imvellers - even as 
late a<; two hundred years ago - a sea 
voyage in the Mediterranean was a 
hazardous enterprise for these men had to 
face not only misadventure from storms, 
shipwreck and capture by pirates but had 
also to contend with a hidden enemy on 
board iL<;elf, i.e. an attack by plabrue. 
Woven throughout our medical history is 
the constant struggle against the 
possibility of an invasion of the Maltese 
Islands by pestilence introduced by 
plague-infected ships. Indeed such a 
threat was uppermost in the minds of the 
Malta port health authorities from the 
time of the Black Death in 1348 to the last 
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major outbreak that struck the Maltese 
Islands in 1813 (1). In the intervening 
centuries the general medical conviction 
was that plague was a "contagious" disease 
transmitted from person to person through 
bodily touch or through the handling of 
fomites or "susceptible" objects such as 
clothing, merchandise, paper, etc that had 
been in contact with plague-stricken 
patients. 
As there were no effective medical 
remedies to prevent the dissemination of 
this rapidly fatal illness or to treat it, the 
only measures that were adopted by our 
predecessors to avert and to stem the 
advance of plague were (a) the 
establishment of a Lazzaretto for the 
isolation of crews and passengers rexhing 
Malta for a period of quarantine lasting 
forty days or less before allowing them to 
communicate with the population; (b) the 
eviction of infected ships from Maltese 
harbours (sfratto): (c) their disinfection 
by flooding their hulls with sea water and, 
after drying them, washing their interior 
with vinegar and finally "smoking" them 
with the profumo (2), (d) destroying the 
ship wholesale with its cargo by burning 
it. 
What follows is an account of the case­
histories of three plague- infected ships 
that came to Malta in the late eighteenth 
century and were destroyed by burning to 
eradicate the "contagion" on board. 
THE VENETIAN KETCH ''LA 

BUONA UNIONE" - 1781 

On 6 July 1781 the Venetian ketch named 
La Buona Unione entered Maltese waters. 
It had left AleXLUldria on 12 May with a 
crew of nine and eighteen Turkish 
passengers bound for Sfax (funis). It 
carried a cargo of flax, wool, linen, camels' 
hides and riee (3). 
The master declared that eight days after 
leaving AleXLUldria plague appeared on 
board and, in the space of nineteen days, 
carried off four crew members and ten 
passengers, the last casualty occurring on 
10 June. He approached the island of 
Cerigo (south of Greece) and later Sfax 
but he was refused entry in both ports 
because neither of them had a LazzarellO 
for the performance of quarantine. 
In conformity with the Health Laws of 
Malta, the Sanitary Commissioners (4) 
ordered the eviction of the ship (sfratto) 
from the island after offering to provide it 
with the necessary food and water 
supplies. On the receipt of this order the 
master stated that he was prepared to 
submit himself and his ship to the most 
rigorous quarantine measures rathcr than 
leaveport. In fact he declined to do so a'> 
he felt sure that there was the plague in the 
bulkhead of his vessel. He added that 
what remained of the crew and passengers 
had not succumbed to the disease thanks 
to the precautions he had taken to limit it'> 
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spread. These consisted in closing the 
hatehways of the bulkhead and the rooms 
where various effect'> belonging 10 the 
passengers had been slOred. Furthennore, 
he had ordered the survivors 10 stay on 
deck. 
The Sanitary Commissioners reported all 
this 10 the Grand Master as the Head of 
Stale. He appointed a board composed 
of the Chief Government Medical 
Officer (protomedico), ex-Sanitary 
Commissioners and seven high nmk:ing 
Knight'> of the Order 10 consider the 
matter. They unanimously decided 10 
evict the ship from porL If, however, the 
crew refused 10 leave harbour one had 10 
keep in mind tha.t resort 10 force 10 induce 
them 10 do so could drive them 10 de~;pair 
and 10 the reckless use of violence - an 
eventuality that would place the "health 
of this population" 10 a far greater danger. 
Under such circumstances, therefore, it 
was resolved that the best expedient was 
"10 admit the crew ,md passengers 10 the 
most rif,rid purification by making them 
leave the ship in the nude, plunging them 
in sea water and providing them with 
fresh clothes 10 be furnished by their 
respective consuls". Furthennore the ship 
wa<; 10 be set on fire "as soon a'> possible" 
under the strictest precautions with all its 
cargo and fittings. 
On 9 July another attempt wa'> made 10 
persuade the Venetian master 10 leave the 
island and proceed 10 either Tunis or 10 
Marseilles each of which had a LazzaretlO. 
The ma'>ter and crew, however, replied 
that if they were forced 10 leave the 
island, they would sail 10 Sicily and on 
reaching the nearest coast they would run 
the ship aground and go a')hore 10 save 
their lives. Realising the danger 10 which 
such "an event would expose the Kingdom 
of Sicily and indeed the whole of Italy" , 
the Sanitary Commissioners offered the 
other alternative 10 the ma'>ter and crew 
i.e. admission 10 the LazzaretlO under the 
conditions mentioned above including 
the burning of their keteh. 
Having accepted this offer, the men on 
board were transferred to the I..azzarct1O 
after being divested of their clothes and 
repeatedly immersed in sea water. They 
were then given a fresh set of vestment'> 
and placed under the surveillance of the 
Sanitary Guards who were prohibited 
form coming in contact with their 
charges.(5) 
The ship wa') towed 10 St Julian's bay 
"some five miles distant from Valletta", 
where a military cordon was established. 
It consisted of "numerous detachments" 
under the command of three knights. 
Besides, a number of armed rowing boats 
were posted at the mouth of the bay to 
prevent anyone from approaching it. The 
ship was placed "in the chosen spot" and 
set on fire, by means of "the implements 
u<;ed in similar ca'>Cs", in the presence of 
the Sanitary Commissioners. 
On the 10 July one of the passengers 
showed suspicious signs of plague in the 
fonn of a carbuncle below the left inguinal 
region. He was isolated from the rest of 
the detainccs. On the 14 a sailor felt sick 
and wa<; also isolated. None of the 
remaining men had any signs of illness so 
much so that by the 10 Augu<;t the Grand 
Master and his Sacred Council decided 10 
submit the healthy men to a double 
quarantine (6) a<; was in fact done. Pratique 
was grdnted on the 19 Seplcmber. 
The sick pa,>senger and seaman eventually 
recovered. The fonner sailed 10 Tunis 
and the latter wa') discharged from the 
Lazzaretto after being washed with 
vinegar and exposed 10 the profumo. 
THE MALTESE CORSAIRING 
GAlLIOT 'SANrA MARIA E ANIME 
DEL PURGATORIa' - 1784. 
On 7 June 1784 the Maltese corsamng 
gaIliot Santa Maria e Anime del Purgatorio 
with forty-two crewmen and ten 
passengers entered Malta harbour. It 
came from the island of Larnpedusa where 
the corsair had boarded a French polacre, 
that had lost four sailors from plague, and 
seized some of it') cargo. The Maltese 
corsairing vessel was attacked by plague 
on its way 10 Malta and by the time it had 
reached Valletta harbour, it had lost 
twenty-two of its crew from this disease. 
The Sacred Council of the Order ordered 
the disembarkation of the surviving men 
at the LaaarctlO and the destruction of 
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the galliot "with all its sails, fittings and 
cargo ...except objects made of metal" ­
presumably the guns and anchor. The 
ship was duly burned "with maximum 
security and precautions" on the foreshore 
of the La77.arctlO (7). The pyre lasted two 
days "until the galliot was reduced 1O 
ashes" (8). 
THE VENETIAN MERCHANTMAN 
OF MASIER MARCO RUGONI • 1784 
Sometime before June 1784 a Venetian 
ship left Salonica (Greece) with a cargo 
of cotlOn, silks and drugs belonging 1O a 
number of merchants who were the 
subjects of the Bey of Tunis. The ship 
appeared before Vallella under full sails 
and made for MarsamxeU Harbour. As it 
pa,>-<.;ed by Fort St Elmo the wateh on duty 
hailed the rruL<.;ler ,md asked the routine 
questions a'> 1O the ship's port of departure, 
the type of cargo and the nurnber of 
passengers on board. No answer was 
forthcoming and none of the crew or 
pa'>-<;cngers were 1O be seen. 
The ship continued on its course 1O the 
interior of the harbour unlil it came 1O a 
halt opposite the Lazzarcuo. The Captain 
of the Port, in the company of two guards, 
approached the ship in a boat in an 
endeavour 1O talk 1O the master; but no 
one appeared and no reply was received 
1O his calls. He ordered the guard,> 1O 
board the ship. They found no one except 
the master, by name Marco Rugoni, who 
was lying in a bunk in his cabin in a 
"moribund state". 
Rugoni 10ld the guards that he was the 
sole sw-vivor of the crew who had died of 
the plague and their corpses had been 
dumped into the sea. He himself 
contracted the disease and in spite of his 
failing strength he endeavoured 1O remain 
at the helm 1O steer the ship inside the 
hmbJur until, overcome by exhaustion 
and somnolence, he had 1O give up the 
effort. He then managed 1O drag himself 
1O his cabin. 
These occurrences were rqJOrted 1O the 
Grand Maslcr who decided 1O send on 
bomd a medical practitioner who had 
successfully treated the plague-stricken 
on previous occa<;ions and "who had 1O be 
prepared 1O sacrifice his own life" - in 
which case his family would receive "a 
substantial compensation". 
The choice fell on the surgeon Stefano 
Borg. He was 1O land the master with the 
help of Sanitmy Guards, convey him 1O 
the La7~.arcuo and attend 1O him until he 
either recovered or died. In either event 
Borg was 1O remain confined to the 
Lau.areuo 1O undergo a qumantine of 
eighty days. The surgeon asscnted 1O 
these conditions and proceeded with his 
task. The master · was admitted 1O the 
Lan.areuo after being immersed three 
times in sea water, dried and placed in a 
bed. He was then given "sugmed water in 
a quart of wine" 1O drink and allowed 1O 
slcep for three hours. On waking he had 
his bubos incised ,md drained. 
We have not been 10ld whether the patient 
recovered or not We do know, however, 
that the surgeon's hazardoLL<; experience 
had a happy ending for he came out of it 
safe and sound and was still alive in 1812 
and professionally active as surgeon 1O 
the Hospital of the Holy Spirit at Rabat 
ncar the old capital of Mdina. (9) 
While master Rugoni was undergoing 
treatment at the Lau.arellO, the Council 
of State of the order of St John was 
deliberating as 1O whether the ship was 1O 
be depumted and then returned 1O its 
owners; or whether it should be lOwed 1O 
the open sea at a safe distance from the 
Maltese coastline and destroyed by selting 
fire 1O it and all its cargo. This second 
proposal was approved by the Council 
and cmried inlO effect with the consent of 
the Venctian government. This, however, 
was not the cnd of the slOry for the 
episode had serious political 
rcpercussions and finally led to mmed 
conflict betecn Venice and Tunis. 
The owners of the cargo claimed 
compensation for the loss of their 
merchandise but the Order of St John 
declined 1O pay any indemnity on the 
grounds that (a) in destroying the ship 
and its cargo it had acted in a manner that 
any 'civilised government' would have 
adopted; and (b) the Order had informed 
all governments, with which it had 
relations, including the Doge of Venice, 
of its actions and they had approved the 
Order's conduct. 
The Bey ignored these mguments and 
continued 1O insist on compensation for 
his subjects. He made it elem that if this 
was not forthcoming within three months 
he would declare wm on Venice. This is 
what, in fact, happened. Venice reacted 
by sending a 'powerful fleet' 1O bombard 
Tunis and reduce it 1O dust On its way 1O 
La Goulette this fleet, under the command 
of Admiml Angclo Emo, called at Malta 
in July 1786 and was joined by galleys of 
the Order (10). The expedition, however, 
failed and the fleet withdrew on account 
of the enemy's concentrated fife from it'> 
artillery defences. The Venetian 
government had no other choice but to 
pay the compensation asked for (11). 
DISCUSSION. 
The Maltese health authorities of the 
eighteenth century did not possess, as we 
do, the bacteriological and medical 
knowledge regmding the origin and 
~'Prcad of plague that became available 
only one hundred yems later lOwmds the 
close of the nineteenth century. Indeed it 
was only then that the threat of plague 
ceased, after a stretch of five centuries, to 
dominate the routes of maritime trade 
and communications in the 
Mediterranean. This was due 1O the 
discovery, between 1894 and 1897, of 
the roles of the bacillus Yersinia pestis, 
the Ranus rallus and the Rauus norvegicus 
and the fleas of rodent<; and humans 
Xenopsylls cheopis and Pulex irritans 
respectively in the causation of plague. 
In the late eighteenth century, therefore, 
our predecessors still lived in an 
uncnlightened pha<;e of the march of 
medicine. What they werc aware of was 
that an outbreak of plague could wipe out 
half the population of a city or country 
within a few months (12). Although they 
were ignorant of the indirect link between 
a plague-infected rat and the ship as its 
habitat, experience had shown them that 
there was a causc-and-effect connection 
betwecn outbreaks of plague and shipping 
and that the surest way of eliminating the 
focLL'> of the malady was the destruction 
of its carrier. Hence their resort 1O a quick 
and radical solution which was the 
burning of houses, furniture and clothing 
since at lea<;t 1495 and even to ships (13). 
This policy was in conformity with the 
practice of other Mediterranean ports, so 
much so that the burning of ships had 
been resorted 1O in Corsica in 1579, in 
Barcellona in 1586, in Santander in 1597 
and in Marseilles in 1720 (14). 
Unless some other records come 1O light, 
it appcars that Rugoni's was the last 
plague-infected ship to be burned in 
I 
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Malta. In fact towards the end of 1786, 
Grand Master Emanuel de Rohan wrote 
to the sanitary port authorities of 
Marseilles to enquire about the measures 
applied by that port for the 'conservation 
of the public health' without, at the same 
time, disrupting commerce by 'an 
excessive rigour' in the imposition of 
safeguards for the security of the public 
health. The authorities at Marseilles 
informed the Grand Master about the 
measures they took in the case of ships 
with suspected and foul bills of health but 
they made no reference to plague-infected 
ships. Likewise the regulations for the 
Malta Lazzaretto issued on the 24th 
December 1786 - that is six months after 
the Rugoni episode - do not deal with the 
subject (15). 
The smooth firnctioning of the quarantine 
system in Malta depended upon an 
efficient and disciplined lay and medical 
staff at various levels of the government 
organisation - starting at the lowest rung 
with the reconnaissance and checking of 
all ships entering harbour by the guard 
posted at Fort St Elmo; the constant 
alertness of the Captain of the Port and his 
staff in investigating unusual occurrences; 
the determined application of the sanitary 
regulations by the Sanitary 
Commissioners at the Barriera; the 
scrupulous surveillance of persons 
detained at the Lazzaretto by the Health 
Guards; the self-abnegation of physicians 
and surgeons sent to the UvJ2fCtto to 
treat the plague-stricken; the reliance on 
the military forces to set-up sanitary 
cordons to seal off areas exposed to the 
'contagion'; and finally ascending to the 
highest government officials responsible 
for prompt decision-making including the 
Grand Master on whom as the Head of 
State rested the final responsibility for all 
actions taken by subordinate individuals 
at the various levels of the sanitary system. 
Though motivated primarily by the urge 
for self-preservation the destruction of a 
plague-infected ship was justified in the 
Order's view because it safeguarded not 
only the immediate Maltese health 
interests but it also provided an effective 
means of protecting the public health of 
neighbouring countries and of marine 
navigation by averting a possible 
widespread epidemiological disaster. In 
fact the Order of St John in justifying the 
burning of plague-infected ships and their 
cargocs declared that in destroying the 
Venetian vessel it had acted 'in the general 
interests of humanity.' (16) 
One last reflection. Malta to-day has 
attained widespread repute for promoting, 
on an international level, the general 
welfare of mankind in such special areas 
as the programme on ageing under the 
auspices of the United Nations (17); the 
common heritage of the sea-bed and the 
fight against the trafficking of addictive 
drugs (18); its stand against nuclear 
armaments (19) and atmospheric pollution 
(20); and it'> support for the protection of 
the ozone layer (21). Members of our 
generation think that these Maltese 
endeavours in ' the general interests of 
humanity' had been unthoughL of in the 
past; but a glance ba:kward in time will 
reveal, as shown in this paper, that the 
concept of 'the general interest of 
humanity' was already recognised and 
motivating the international policy of 
Malta in safeguarding the regional health 
and welfare of mankind as long ago a'i the 
eighteenth century. 
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